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Abstract  
In this paper, we apply a flowchart approach to investigate Malaysia’s automobile 
cluster policy. We investigate whether the industrial cluster policy has been 
successful or not, suggest policy prescriptions, and propose a way to prioritize policy 
measures. Our flowchart approach leads to the following three policy prescriptions: 
(1) Malaysian firms should establish sites for exporting compact cars with automatic 
transmissions; (2) actors in the public, semi-public and private sector should work to 
upgrade skilled labor; and (3) the central government should promote liberalization 
and deregulation to attract foreign firms into the supporting industries. 
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1.  Introduction 
Industrial cluster policies have been put into practice in many countries around the 
world, including in Asia. Thailand continues to grow as the “Detroit of Asia” and 
Malaysia plans to establish automobile clusters by implementing an industrial cluster 
policy. However, Malaysia’s policy has not been as successful as that of Thailand. This 
offers an opportunity to discuss whether industrial cluster policy is effective or not. No 
practical method for prescribing industrial cluster policy based on a flowchart 
approach has yet been established. 
Komiya, Okuno and Suzumura (1988) define industrial policy as a policy under 
which the central government intervenes in dynamic inefficiency or market failures 
and fosters industries by protecting infant industries. Local governments play a crucial 
role in the success or failure of cluster policy, since it is not a national growth strategy 
but a regional one. The role of local governments is increasing relative to that of 
central governments, as the worldwide trend toward decentralization is bringing a shift 
from industrial policy to industrial cluster policy. 
Porter (1998) constructed a diamond model, finding that four factors — (1) demand 
conditions, (2) factor conditions, (3) firm strategy, structure and rivalry, and (4) related 
and supporting industries — offer sufficient conditions for innovation in industrial 
clusters. However, it is not easy to satisfy the four conditions at the same time. The aim 
of our flowchart model is to attempt to prioritize the four factors in order, not on a 
diamond plane but in a line. Markusen (1996) classified industrial districts as the three 
types: Marshallian ID, Hub-and-spoke and Satellite platform. In the case of the 
Hub-and-spoke type, he found a relationship between anchor firms and their related 
firms. However, Markusen (1996) neither provided conditions for the formation of 
industrial clusters nor ordered the factors of the conditions. Kuchiki (2005b) proposed 
a practical flowchart model of industrial cluster policy by ordering and prioritizing 
policy measures in a line. 
The purpose of this paper is to offer prescriptions for Malaysia’s automobile industry 
cluster policy, using a flowchart approach. The purpose of our flowchart approach is to 
diagnose whether the industrial cluster policy will succeed or not. We will apply it to 
Malaysia’s automobile cluster policy, with the aim to make prescriptions. We prioritize 
the policy measures of Malaysia’s industrial cluster policy. The flowchart approach 
involves setting a target, ordering the policy measures, and finding actors to implement 
the policy measures.  
 As step 1, using questionnaires provided by the Japan Bank for International 
Cooperation and Japan External Trade Organization, we determine which factors along 
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the flowchart process constitute the problems of industrial cluster policy. As step 2, we 
determine policy measures and actors for solving the problems, based on interviews 
with professionals on the automobile industry of Malaysia. For step 3, we offer 
prescriptions for the industrial cluster policy by specifying the policy measures and 
actors along the flowchart. 
Our flowchart approach leads to the following three conclusions. First, the projected 
increase in future demand in the local markets in Malaysia will not be sufficient to start 
the flowchart process. Second, the shortage of skilled labor is a crucial problem for 
further industrial agglomeration in Malaysia. Third, one of the factors hindering 
foreign investors from investing in Malaysia is the institutional regulations. The second 
and third conclusions tell us that developing an automobile cluster in Malaysia will 
require building the capacity of both skilled human resources and institutions such as 
laws and regulations. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our flowchart model. Section 
3 explains Malaysia’s automobile industry cluster policy. Section 4 is an application of 
the flowchart approach to the automobile industry cluster policy of Malaysia. Section 5 
offers prescriptions for the automobile industry cluster policy. Section 6 concludes the 
paper. 
 
 2. Patterns of the flowchart models 
This section proposes a flowchart approach for promoting agglomeration and 
innovation among firms in the hi-technology and automobile industries. We propose 
some sufficient conditions for allowing industrial cluster policy to lead firms to 
agglomerate as step I, and innovate as step II.  
 
(1) A prototype flowchart model for cluster policy 
We cannot strictly prove our hypothesis that a flowchart approach will be useful using 
the inductive method or deductive method. Our aim is to propose sufficient conditions 
for the success of an industrial cluster policy. That is, we hope to provide a flowchart 
that can lead to the successful formation of an industrial cluster if the sufficient 
conditions listed in the flowchart are satisfied.  
It should be noted that we can provide illustrations of cases where our hypothesis of a 
flowchart approach holds. We can show a large number of cases, but cannot prove our 
hypothesis as a sufficient condition using inductive and deductive methods. Our 
flowchart cannot show that other orderings of factors different from that of our 
flowchart will not work. We can show, by increasing the number of the cases, that our 
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flowchart may be generally applied to industrial cluster policy in other regions.  
Our hypothesis is a practical one, since we can form a cluster if we follow the 
following four steps. First, we determine the ingredients of A, B, C, D and E. Second, 
we select the minimum number of factors from the ingredients found above needed to 
form a flowchart (see Figure 2). Third, we order them along the flowchart (see Figure 
3). Fourth, we specify actors to proceed at each step of the flowchart if the step goes to 
not “Yes” but “No” (see Figure 4).  
Our flowchart of the automobile industry cluster policy follows the following process. 
First, a local government establishes an industrial zone to act as a receptacle for 
foreign investors. Second, the government builds capacity for improving business and 
living conditions for foreign investors. The elements of capacity building include: (1) 
constructing physical infrastructure, (2) building institutions, (3) developing human 
resources, and (4) creating living conditions amenable to foreign investors. Physical 
infrastructure refers to roads, ports, communications, and so on. Institutional building, 
which is also crucial to success in inviting foreign investors, includes streamlining 
investment procedures through one-stop services, deregulation, and the introduction of 
preferential tax systems. Human resources, which are usually an initial condition for 
foreign investors, include unskilled labor, skilled labor, managers, researchers, and 
professionals. The living environment, for example, includes the provision of hospitals 
and international schools in order to attract foreign firms. An anchor firm will be ready 
to invest after the capacity building mentioned above has been carried out.  
Our flowchart approach is illustrated in Figure 5. First, we ask whether industrial 
zones have been established. If these have not, we must decide which actors should 
establish such zones. Once these actors are identified, we return to the main stream of 
the flowchart.  
Next we apply the flowchart’s second step, capacity building, which takes place after 
the establishment of industrial zones. We examine whether there is an adequate water 
supply for the industrial zones (see Figure 6). We proceed along the flowchart to 
examine power supply, communication, and transportation.  
After looking at the physical infrastructure, we examine whether institutions are in 
place. The central government must institutionalize national tax systems and the local 
government must institutionalize local tax systems. It is well known that one-stop 
investment procedures are crucial for success in attracting foreign investors. 
In the area of human resource development, an abundance of unskilled labor with a 
high literacy rate is a necessary condition for luring foreign investors whose purpose is 
to employ cheap labor. On the other hand, an industrial cluster sometimes faces a 
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shortage of skilled labor after industrialization has gone forward; universities and 
on-the-job training centers for innovation are then needed for further development. 
Living conditions are crucial for attracting foreign investors. Researchers from 
investor companies have incentives to work hard if they can enjoy their lives. It is 
necessary to create satisfactory conditions in areas such as housing, schools, hospitals, 
and so on. These are the final conditions that must be satisfied to bring in anchor firms. 
Figure 7 shows the priorities of each actor. Local governments play the main role in 
establishing industrial zones, supplying electricity, facilitating transport, and forming 
institutions. The first priority of local government in Figure 6 is to construct industrial 
zones to accept foreign investors. The second priority during that stage is to supply 
electricity, facilitate transportation and form institutions. The main priorities of the 
central government are to supply electricity and build institutions. 
The typical industrial cluster policy was theorized by defining an industrial zone as  
“quasi-public goods,” and it was shown that the policy enhances economic growth 
under a production function of “increasing returns to scale” of an anchor company. The 
critical amounts of the production of “scale economies” that are used by the related 
companies to decide whether or not to invest in clusters were also shown (Kuchiki 
(2005a)).  
 
(2) Demand conditions 
It should be noted that our flowchart approach does not explicitly discuss the demand 
side in the manufacturing industry, since we suppose that the demand conditions are 
satisfied as follows: 
Case 1: 
(i) An anchor firm locates in an exportprocessing zone and exports its products. In 
this case, there is little constraint on its demand, since its factory can attain its 
minimal optimal level of production by exporting products to the world. In this 
case, the logistics of the anchor firm are crucial to attaining the minimal optimal 
level. 
(ii) Therefore, suppliers to the anchor firm can attain their minimal optimal levels of 
production. The demand for the suppliers is “demand derived from the anchor 
firm.” 
Case 2: 
(i) The anchor firm sells its products locally. In this case, the market size in the place 
where the anchor firm is located should be large enough for the anchor firm to 
attain the minimal optimal level of production. The anchor firm decides to invest 
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in a place once it judges the local demand satisfies this condition. 
(ii) The suppliers’ condition is the same as that in Case 1.  
 
(3) Patterns of flowchart models 
This section presents patterns for flowchart models in the information technology 
industry, biotechnology industry and automobile industry. The flowchart model for the 
IT industry is almost as the same as that of the biotechnology industry. 
Knowledge-intensive industries include the IT industry, biotechnology industry and 
nanotechnology industry. The flowchart model for knowledge industries is different 
from that of the automobile industry. Knowledge industries require, as a precondition, 
the existence of universities. Local governments play an important role in 
implementing the cluster policy. The success in the cluster policy in Austin, Texas in 
the United States is based on the leadership of the governor of Texas. The partnership 
between the state government and municipal government has been instrumental in the 
success of the cluster policy. 
One large difference between the flowcharts of the automobile industry and the 
knowledge industry is that anchor firms play an important role in implementing the 
automobile industry cluster policy, while superstars play an important role in 
implementing the knowledge industry cluster policy. The reason is as follows. While 
the knowledge industry requires partnership between intellectuals, a car assembler as 
an anchor firm is a necessity in the automobile industry cluster policy, considering that 
a car is composed of more than twenty thousand individual components. Superstars are 
needed for the knowledge industry cluster policy since knowledge is embodied in 
human resources. Preferential treatment is required in order to lure superstars. 
Partnerships between universities, large firms, startup firms, multinational firms, and 
laboratories are required for innovations in digital technology. Superstars were crucial 
for achieving success in creating the partnership and industrial agglomeration in Austin. 
The leadership of heads of local governments and worldwide superstars in the 
knowledge industry are the keys to the success of cluster policy. 
Science parks and capacity building are necessary for a knowledge industry cluster 
policy. The following three points must be taken into consideration when 
implementing a knowledge industry cluster policy. First, the regulations should not be 
terribly strict. Second, mechanisms should be in place to link patents and innovations. 
Third, patentees and innovators need to be matched. Matching funds are effective for 
this.  
Tsuji, Miyahara, Ueki and Komolavanji (2006) pioneered the development of an 
6 
 
econometric method giving priority to policy measures. They find support for the 
prioritization of the flowchart approach except for the fact that infrastructure was not 
found to be a significant factor.  
 
3. Malaysia’s industrial policy and industrial cluster policy 
 
(1) History of Proton 
 Malaysia’s national car project was carried out as an industrial policy. In 1981, the 
Malaysian government proposed a joint venture with Mitsubishi, a Japanese automaker, 
to build a Malaysian car. The cabinet approved the National Car Project in 1982, and 
Heavy Industries Corporation of Malaysia (HICOM) signed an agreement with 
Mitsubishi. Proton, a national car company, was established on May 7, 1983. Its 
factory was established in the HICOM compound. Its first car, named Proton Saga, 
was launched in 1985, and in 1986 began to be exported to Bangladesh. Production 
reached 50,000 cars in 1987, and 500,000 cars in 1993. The Proton R&D facility 
opened in 1993, and in 1996 the Proton was being exported to 31 countries. The 
national car project is a so-called industrial policy, or selective government 
intervention policy to nurture national firms. The policy succeeded in allowing Proton 
to export its products. 
However, Proton cancelled its agreement with Mitsubishi in 2002. Proton’s share of 
sales in the Malaysian market reached about 90% at the highest but fell to 24% in 2005. 
In 2006, Proton reduced its car prices in Malaysia along with several other car 
manufacturers as part of a move by the government to lower car prices. Thus, in 2007, 
Proton found itself facing the difficulty of management without an alliance with a 
foreign firm.  
In 1996, Proton City was established as a base for agglomeration by its related 
suppliers. The Malaysian government established barriers to investments by foreign 
firms in order to protect national cars, including Proton. The policy may have had 
some negative effects on the attraction of foreign investors into Malaysia or on 
promoting the agglomeration of foreign firms. 
 
(2) History of Perodua  
 Perodua, a national project, means “second national car” in Malay language.  
Japanese firms also contributed to the capitalization of Perodua in the following ratios. 
The Malaysian government and Japanese firms invested 73% and 27%, respectively, of 
the total capital, when POBS of Perodua was establishment in November 2001. The 
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POBS invested 100% of the capital in both PSSB (Perodua’s marketing company) and 
its vehicle manufacturing company. The capital structure changed in December 2001, 
with the Japanese firm acquiring 51% of capital in the vehicle manufacturing company 
(or PMSB/PEMSB). The shares of the Malaysian government and the Japanese in 
POBS remained at 73% and 27%, but POBS and the Japanese company now owned 
49% and 51% of the capital of PCSB, respectively. POBS still owned 100% of the 
capital of PSSB, the marketing company. POBS and PCSB owned 49% and 51% of the 
capital of the vehicle manufacturing company. In summary, the Japanese company 
owned 47.04% of the total capital of the marketing company and the vehicle 
manufacturing company, but 51% of the total capital of Perodua.  
The production processes consist of mainly pressing, painting and assembling. There 
are 32 Japanese staff members working in important positions in these production 
processes (November 2006).  
Production of Perodua cars grew steadily to 102 thousand in 2004, recorded 116 
thousand in 2005 and was expected to be 134 thousand in 2006. The production of 
Protons was 141 thousand in 2004 and 139 thousand in 2005, but fell to 102 thousand 
in 2006. The market share of Perodua grew from 25% in 2004 to 30% in 2006, while 
that of Proton, which was more than 80% at one point, gradually reduced to about 20% 
in 2006.  
The local contents ratio of Kancil and Myvi, both produced by Perodua is about 80%, 
while that of Perodua’s Rusa and Kembara models are about 50%. There are 145 
domestic suppliers. There are 59 local suppliers, with a share of 40%. The 19 Japanese 
suppliers have a share of 13.1%. Once a process of industrial agglomeration as 
illustrated in step 1 is completed, the feedback process illustrated in our flowchart in 
Figure 1 can be used to examine whether further industrial agglomeration is possible.   
 
(3) The Third Industrial Master Plan (IMP3: MTI (Ministry of Trade and Industry) 
(2006)) of Malaysia  
As explained in MTI (2006), the Third Industrial Master Plan of Malaysia will 
provide an overall development framework for the manufacturing sector and detailed 
sub-sector plans for the 2006-2020 period. Automotive clusters are to be established in 
Tanjung Malim (Perak), Gurun (Kedah) and Pekan (Pahang), where producers and 
suppliers of parts and components, and distribution networks have been established. 
Other areas with some clustering features include Bertam (Pulau Pinang), Serendah 
(Selangor) and Pego (Melaka). 
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(4) Ninth Malaysia Plan 2006-2010 
(i) Chapter 4 of Prime Minister’s Department (2006) identifies anchor companies for 
automoile clusters as Perusahaan Otomobile Nasional Berhad (PROTON), Petroliam 
Nasional Berhad (PETRONAS), Tenaga Nasional Berhad (TNB), and a number of 
MNCs. It lists more than 200 first-tier vendor companies involved in manufacturing 
and related activities. 
(ii) While the contribution of MNCs to the electric and electronics industry will 
remain significant, local investments as well as technological capabilities in existing 
and new electric and electronics activities will be further enhanced. These will leverage 
developments within the cybercities of Bayan Lepas, Pulau Pinang and Kulim Hi-Tech 
Park in Kedah (Prime Minister’s Department (2006), p. 120). 
(iii) During the Plan period, shared services and outsourcing (SSO) will be positioned 
as a major new source of growth. In order to further strengthen the SSO cluster, 
assistance such as access to funds for joint ventures as well as mergers and acquisitions 
will be made available (Prime Minister’s Department (2006), p.121). 
  
(5) Transportation costs between countries in ASEAN: 
Perodua’s production system is planned from the perspective of its supply chain 
management in Asia. Toyota divides its production systems between China and 
ASEAN in consideration of the logistics under the current situation of Asia’s regional 
integration. In other words, it has two systems of supply chain management, one for 
ASEAN and the other for China. The decrease in the tariff rates of ASEAN under the 
AFTA (ASEAN Free Trade Agreement) affected Malaysia’s management of firms in 
ASEAN. Daihatsu’s plants in Indonesia and Thailand now supply parts and 
components to the Daihatsu plant in Malaysia. In particular, the Indonesian plant 
supplies parts and components to other countries in ASEAN, partly because the plant 
in Indonesia is large enough to export them.  
Decisions on whether the plant in Malaysia imports parts and components from other 
countries are made based on the costs of transportation and the size of the domestic 
demand in Malaysia. For example, it is costly to package painted car bodies in order to 
import cars from Thailand to Malaysia. The outward appearance of cars is an important 
factor in selling them, since consumers’ choices are made partly depending on the 
perfection of the outward painted appearance. The painted bodies have to be 
transported from Thailand to Malaysia without being scratched. Trucks can efficiently 
carry bodies to realize the just-in-time lean production system, but Perodua cannot use 
trucks since road conditions from Thailand to Malaysia are not good enough to allow 
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the bodies to be transported without scratch. Ships, however, can transport the 
painted-bodies without scratch. Using ships can lower the average costs by 
guaranteeing that a minimum number of bodies can be carried. 
 
(6) Demand conditions in Malaysia: 
Next, we will explain the situation of suppliers in Malaysia. One of the factors that 
determines whether foreign suppliers decide to move to Malaysia is the demand from 
their anchor firm, or the size of its production. The total demand for cars in Malaysia 
recovered following the Asian Currency Crisis in 1997 and increased to 550 thousand 
per year in 2005. This large increase in automobile sales was not anticipated since the 
population of Malaysia was about 25 million in 2005. One staff member of an 
automobile company in Malaysia forecasts that car sales will increase by about 100 
thousand in the next ten years. It is difficult for suppliers in Malaysia to realize a 
minimum average cost based on the minimum level of production. This is why 
Japanese suppliers have hesitated to move into Malaysia. The demand conditions for 
attaining the minimum size level is a pre-condition for starting our flowchart process in 
Figure 1. We conclude that the automobile industry in Malaysia today, with a 
production level of 500 thousand in its domestic market, does not satisfy the minimum 
demand condition.  
 Furthermore, there are two more reasons why Japanese suppliers find it difficult to 
move into Malaysia. They are (i) the labor shortage and (ii) instability in institutions 
such as tax systems.  
(i) The Malaysian government has worked, since the early 1990s, to develop the 
human resources necessary to nurture suppliers in the automobile industry. The 
Japanese government has cooperated with these human resource development projects. 
Malaysia is unfavorable to China in the human resource development since Chinese 
firms acquire Japan’s technologies by themselves. It is said that in the past, Japanese 
and Korean firms went through the same process of acquiring technology by imitating 
foreign technology that Chinese firms are now experiencing. But Malaysian firms have 
in many failed to go through this process. Foreign firms in Malaysia, including 
Japanese firms, complain about the shortage of skilled labor. Human resource 
development, or capacity building on our flowchart, is needed before the next step 
forward can be made in the cluster policy.  
The ratio of automation by robots in Perodua’s production process highlights the 
shortage of skilled labor. The ratio, which in Japan is 99% is 9% in Malaysia, 
according to our interview with a staff member of Perodua in October 2006. He told us 
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that few local workers are skilled in maintaining robots, though Perodua provides 
components such as cylinders to Proton. The reporter told us at that time that human 
resource development was needed. 
(ii) Malaysia’s tax system was at times favorable to foreign firms, but it was changed 
into an unfavorable one when the Malaysian government started to protect domestic 
firms. The tax system has changed over time, and is too unstable to allow foreign firms 
to forecast profits. It is said that the current instability of the tax system is not 
acceptable, though such instability is seen in many developing countries including the 
value added tax system of China, the import tariff rates of Vietnam and the tax system 
that gave preferences to pioneer foreign firms in the 1990s in Malaysia. We can use the 
case of the tariff system reform in Malaysia in 2006 as an illustration. Under the 
reform, tariff rates on automobile components were suddenly raised, without notice, in 
2006. Given the unstable institutions, firms cannot calculate the rate of return on their 
investment in Malaysia and find it difficult to decide to invest in Malaysia. In the long 
run, the Malaysian government needs to stabilize the tax system.  
 
4. Applying the Flowchart Approach to Malaysia’s Automobile Industry Cluster 
Policy 
This section illustrates how Malaysia’s industrial cluster policy, illustrated in a 
flowchart process in Figure 1, faced difficulty in proceeding to further steps due to the 
shortages of demand and skilled labor, and the lack of development of supporting 
industries. 
Here, we summarize the results of our application of a flowchart approach to 
Malaysia’s automobile industry cluster policy. Malaysia does not satisfy the demand 
conditions that are a precondition of the flowchart approach. Malaysia’s domestic 
demand is not promising since the population is small, numbering around 25 million 
people. The export demand is also not promising, since it will be difficult for Malaysia 
to become an exporter due to the underdevelopment of its supporting industries.  
Figure 1 gives a step-by-step picture of the flowchart approach. On (a) industrial 
zones, there are many industrial zones including Proton city. On (b) capacity building, 
the infrastructure of Malaysia is better than that of Thailand. On institutional aspects, 
the transparency of Malaysia’s investment laws is slightly inferior to that of Thailand. 
On human resources, Malaysia has less unskilled labor than Thailand, but has more 
skilled labor and managers. On living conditions, Malaysia has few problems at all. 
There are a sufficient number of anchor firms such as Toyota, Mitsubishi, Honda, and 
Ford operating in Malaysia. However, the supporting industries are greatly inferior to 
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those of Thailand.  
There are two ways for Malaysia to resolve the above situation. One is to increase the 
demand, which is a precondition of the flowchart approach, by exporting more 
products. This means that anchor firms should establish export sites to increase 
products. But this will be difficult, since Malaysia does not have an abundance of 
cheap labor. Another solution is to go to step II, innovation process, from step I, 
agglomeration process, in Figure 1. A precondition for this solution is the existence of 
universities. However, Malaysia does not have many universities. It does, however, 
have the opportunity to create a new industry by combining the electric and electronics 
industry with the automobile industry.  
 
(1) Comparison between Malaysia and Thailand of the process of industrial cluster 
policy  
Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC (2006)) surveyed 597 firms, as 
shown in Table 1. General machines, electric and electronics, transport machines, 
automobiles, and precision machinery make up 60.8% of the manufacturing industry, 
compared to 15.3% for the automobile industry. The table shows changes in countries 
and regions seen as the most promising place to do business in the three-year medium 
term. The ratio of votes obtained by Thailand to the total was 28% in 2002, 29% in 
2006 and nearly the same figure from 2002 to 2006. The ratio of votes obtained by 
Vietnam to the total increased from 15% in 2002 to 33% in 2006. Indonesia’s share 
decreased from 15% in 2002 to 8% in 2006. Similarly, that of Malaysia decreased from 
8% in 2002 to 5% in 2006. This section explains why Malaysia’s ratio decreased, and 
why Thailand’s did not. Figure 8 shows that the numbers of firms planning to 
strengthen and enlarge their branches in the automobile industries of Thailand, 
Indonesia, Vietnam, and Malaysia are 55, 24, 15, and 10, respectively. Malaysia has 
the smallest number among them.  
Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO (2006)) surveyed 966 firms. Of these 
firms, 44.2% were in general machines, electronic and electronics appliances, electric 
and electronics parts, transport equipment, and transport equipment, whereas 17.2% 
were in transport equipment and parts. Of these firms, 937 answered a question on 
what they saw as suitable production sites in the medium and long run. The numbers of 
respondents citing Thailand, Vietnam, India, China, and Malaysia were 237, 199, 110, 
100, and 79, respectively.  
From these surveys by JBIC and JETRO, we may conclude that Japanese firms are 
expected to invest in Thailand, Vietnam, or India, rather than Malaysia. This section 
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elucidates the differences between Malaysia and Thailand in terms of the factors for 
agglomeration and clustering. 
Table 3, which illustrates the domestic sales figures of automobiles in the main 
ASEAN countries, shows that those of Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand are almost 
the same at 487 thousand, 483 thousand, and 626 thousand, respectively. Table 4, 
which gives the automobile production figures of the main ASEAN countries, shows 
that the production in Malaysia in 2004 was 480 thousand while that of Thailand was 
twice as large, with 920 thousand. Table 5 shows the difference between the production 
figures and the domestic sales figures. For Thailand, this figure was 460 thousand in 
2005, since firms had sites for exporting products.   
Table 6 clarifies the problems in terms of the localization of employees, products and 
technology. Problems in localizing employees include a shortage of local managers 
employable at reasonable wages and top managers to promote localization. Both 
Malaysia and Thailand have a similar shortage of local managers and top managers, 
and the shortage in Thailand is more serious than that of Malaysia. Problems in 
localizing products faced by all the countries shown in Table 6 are a shortage of 
technology at local firms. Problems in localizing technology faced by all countries 
shown in Table 6 include a shortage of local skilled labor at reasonable wages. In sum, 
the common problems faced by all of the countries are a shortage of local managers, 
top managers and local skilled labor. The problems of Thailand seem more serious than 
those of Malaysia. Thus, the shortage of human resources alone is not sufficient to 
explain the difference of export capacity between the two countries. 
Table 7 shows reasons for why certain countries and regions are seen as promising. 
All ten countries and regions shown in Table 7 give high priority to promising local 
markets. A large local market is a pre-condition for decisions by multinational 
corporations on locations. It is expected that in the future, the markets of Vietnam and 
Indonesia will become larger than that of Thailand. All ten countries and regions 
shown in Table 7 give a high priority to the existence of abundant labor.  
Table 8 shows an evaluation index of the investment environment of ASEAN and 
India in comparison with China. The index is calculated as follows: 
A = (Number of firms who replied “superior”)-(Number of firms who replied 
“inferior”), 
B = (Number of firms who replied “superior”) + (Number of firms who replied 
“inferior”), and 
Evaluation Index=(A/B)×100. 
The indices for Malaysia and Thailand are very similar, except that the level of 
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development of supporting industries of Malaysia (-6.6) is much worse than that of 
Thailand (+27.5). Table 6 also shows that, on the problems in localizing products, the 
lack of local supporting industries of Thailand is 6.9% while that of Malaysia is 11.2%.  
We examined the problems of Malaysia’s automobile industry cluster using the 
questionnaires data from JBIC and JRTRO, and reached the following three 
conclusions. First, Malaysia has a shortage of domestic demand for cars. Second, it has 
a shortage of unskilled labor. Third, its supporting industries are underdeveloped 
compared with those of Thailand. Considering these problems, we raise the following 
six questions: Is the size of Malaysia’s automobile market large enough? Can Malaysia 
host export sites? Will foreign automobile firms invest in Malaysia under the present 
regulations? Will foreign automobile firms invest in Malaysia despite the shortage of 
unskilled labor? Can Malaysia catch up Thailand in its supporting industries? Are the 
controls over foreign capital inflow of suppliers to the national cars sufficiently 
deregulated? 
 
5. Prescriptions for Malaysia’s automobile industry 
We carried out a survey of Malaysia’s automobile industry cluster policy to determine 
whether we can solve its problems using our flowchart approach. We interviewed ten 
professionals on the automobile industry, and found the following six results, as 
summarized in Table 9. (The ten respondents included one staff member of a national 
car project, two professors at the University of Malaya, one staff member of a national 
car supplier, two instructors for small and medium enterprises, three staff members of 
Japanese semi-government organizations, and one Japanese government officer in 
Malaysia). 
 
(1) On the size of Malaysia’s domestic car market, Malaysians cannot be expected to 
buy more cars since the size of the population is small at about 25 million in 2007, per 
capita income is more than US$5,000, and each family owns one car on average. The 
total domestic demand for automobiles might not increase from the current level of 
approximately 500 thousand per year. Only two of the ten respondents stated that the 
demand was not small.  
 
(2) On the question of whether Malaysia can host export sites, six of the ten answered 
“Yes.” A division of labor between Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia is needed for 
Malaysia to become a host to export sites. Thailand and Indonesia specialized in 
pick-up trucks and multi-purpose vehicles, respectively. Malaysia can specialize in 
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compact cars with automatic transmissions. Automatic cars are not very popular in 
Asia in 2007. However, Malaysia must compete with India, which is expected to 
increase its production of compact cars, and China, which has excess production 
capacity for compact cars. 
 
(3) On the question of whether foreign auto firms will invest in Malaysia under the 
present regulations protecting the national cars such as Proton and Perodua, three of 
the ten answered “Yes.” Most of the respondents judged that deregulation and 
liberalization would be required to attract foreign investors. Malaysia should try to 
promote the influx of foreign direct investment through deregulation.  
 
(4) On the question of whether foreign auto firms will invest in Malaysia despite the 
shortage of unskilled labor, eight of the ten answered “Yes.” Malaysia has introduced 
unskilled labor from foreign countries for the last twenty years. The foreign countries 
were mainly Indonesia and Bangladesh in the 1990s, and Vietnam, Myanmar and 
Nepal in 2007. Taiwan is similar to Malaysia in introducing unskilled labor from 
foreign countries. One of the respondents answered that the social cost had increased 
since the share of foreigners in the total population exceeded 20% in 2007. It is 
expected that Malaysia will adopt a policy of refraining from introducing more foreign 
labor.  
 
(5) On the question of whether Malaysia can catch up with Thailand in the supporting 
industries, three of the ten answered “Yes.” Thailand has actively introduced foreign 
direct investment while Malaysia has tried to protect and foster its domestic firms. For 
this reason, there is a large difference in the development of the supporting industries 
between the two countries. However, the development of Thailand’s supporting 
industries has relied on foreign capital, while Malaysia has tried to foster domestic 
firms in the supporting industries. Malaysia is slowly nurturing local suppliers step by 
step. 
 
(6) On the question of whether the controls over inflows of foreign capital into 
suppliers of the national cars are sufficiently deregulated, three of the ten answered 
“Yes.” Some respondents stated that generally speaking, suppliers of parts, who 
provide their products to Proton and Perodua, cannot meet world quality standards. 
Some local suppliers related to the national cars provide their products to Japanese 
anchor firms in Malaysia. They may be competing with other suppliers in the world. 
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Table 9 shows the answers to the questions, and Figure 9 shows the prescription for 
Malaysia’s automobile industry cluster policy. The prescriptions are as follows: 
organizations in the quasi-public sector and private firms must act as actors to further 
develop skilled labor; the central government must further deregulate laws on the 
national car policy to introduce foreign direct investment; and Malaysia must aim to 
host sites for exporting compact cars (See Figure 10). 
 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
 In this paper we applied a flowchart approach to Malaysia’s automobile industry 
cluster policy, with the aim to elucidate problems in the industrial cluster policy, 
conduct interviews and questionnaires on the problems, and offer prescriptions for the 
problems by specifying the actors to solve them.  
In step 1, we found the following three facts regarding Malaysia. First, Malaysia has 
shortages in both domestic demand and foreign demand, which are preconditions of 
the flowchart approach. The projected future outlook of demand in local markets in 
Malaysia does not satisfy the pre-conditions for starting the flowchart process. Second, 
Malaysia has a shortage of unskilled labor for attracting foreign investors. The shortage 
of skilled labor is a crucial problem in view of the creation of further industrial 
agglomeration in Malaysia. Malaysia has introduced foreign workers into the palm oil 
industry and the construction industry, from Indonesia, Bangladesh and other countries. 
It has become difficult to continue the policy, however, due to the threat to social 
stability. Third, Malaysia has a lack of developed supporting industries in comparison 
with Thailand since one of the factors that hinders foreign investors from investing in 
Malaysia is its institutional instability.  
In step 2, we came up with the following six questions: Is the size of the automobile 
market of Malaysia sufficiently large? Can Malaysia be a host for export sites? Will 
foreign automobile firms invest in Malaysia under the present regulations? Will foreign 
automobile firms invest in Malaysia despite the shortage of unskilled labor? Can 
Malaysia catch up with Thailand in the supporting industries? Are the controls over 
foreign capital inflows into suppliers to the national cars sufficiently deregulated? On 
these questions, we interviewed professionals on the problems of Malaysia’s 
automobile industry. 
In step 3, our flowchart approach lead the following three policy measure 
prescriptions: Firms in Malaysia should establish sites for exporting automatic compact 
cars; actors or economic agents in the public, semi-public and private sectors should 
endeavor to upgrade skilled labor; the central government should liberalize and 
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deregulate its laws to attract foreign firms in the supporting industries. The 
prescriptions for the automobile industry cluster policy are as follows: Firms in 
Malaysia should aim to become sites for exporting automatic compact cars while firms 
in Indonesia and Thailand are engaged in exporting pick-up trucks and multi-purpose 
vehicles, respectively; organizations in the quasi-public sector and private firms as 
actors should further upgrade skilled labor rather than nurture unskilled labor; the 
central government must further liberalize and deregulate laws on the national car 
policy to attract foreign direct investment into the supporting industries in Malaysia. 
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1. Find factors.
2. Select some factors from all factors.
　　⇒Figure 2, Figure 3
3. Apply the flowchart approach to a region and find actors if the answer 
   at a step of the flowchart is 'No'.
　　⇒Figure 4
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Figure 5: Flowchart Approach: Step I. Agglomeration
yes
(water, electricity, communication, transport)
Does industrial zone
exist?
Find actors
Yes
No
Assign Private Companies Priority
Assign Local Govt. Priority
Assign Central Govt. Priority
Assign Semi Govt. Priority
Assign NPO's Priority
Does infrastructure
exist?
Find actors
Yes
No
Assign Private Companies Priority
Assign Local Govt. Priority
Assign Central Govt. Priority
Assign Semi Govt. Priority
Assign NPO's Priority
Do institutions exist? Find actors
Yes
No
Do human resources
exist?
Find actors
Yes
No
Are living conditions
sufficient?
Find actorsNo
Capacity
Building
Specify core-competence
Are conditions sufficient
for Anchor firms?
Yes
No
Feedback
Assign Private Companies Priority
Assign Local Govt. Priority
Assign Central Govt. Priority
Assign Semi Govt. Priority
Assign NPO's Priority
1
1
1
2, 3
1
Assign Private Companies Priority
Assign Local Govt. Priority
Assign Central Govt. Priority
Assign Semi Govt. Priority
Assign NPO's Priority
4
2
Assign Private Companies Priority
Assign Local Govt. Priority
Assign Central Govt. Priority
Assign Semi Govt. Priority
Assign NPO's Priority
2
Prioritization
Step I:
Agglomeration
Source: Kuchiki (2007).  
20 
 
Figure 6. Flowchart Approach: StepⅠ. Infrastructure
                                                    (Capacity Building)
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＜The automobile industry＞
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number of replies 9 2 3 3 55 24 10 5 76 29 15
Source： 2006 JBIC Institute
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Figure 9. Prescription on the automobile industry clustering in Malaysia
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Figure 10.  Flowchart Approach
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1 China 89 China 93 China 91 China 82 China 77
2 Thailand 28 Thailand 29 Thailand 30 India 36 India 47
3 USA 26 USA 22 India 24 Thailand 31 Vietnam 33
4 Indonesia 15 Vietnam 18 Vietnam 22 Vietnam 27 Thailand 29
5 Vietnam 15 India 14 USA 20 USA 20 USA 21
6 India 13 Indonesia 13 Russia 10 Russia 13 Russia 20
7 Korea 8 Korea 9 Indonesia 10 Korea 11 Brazil 9
8 Taiwan 8 Taiwan 7 Korea 9 Indonesia 9 Korea 9
9 Malaysia 8 Malaysia 6 Taiwan 8 Brazil 7 Indonesia 8
10 Brazil 5 Russia 5 Malaysia 6 Taiwan 7 Taiwan 6
11 Singapore 4 Singapore 5 Singapore 3 Malaysia 5 Malaysia 5
Source： 2006 JBIC Institute
( number of repliers: 484)
Ranking
(number of repliers: 418) (number of repliers: 490) (number of repliers: 497) ( number of repliers: 483)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Table 1. Changes in Countries and Regions for Promising Businesses in the Medium Term (three years)
（Unit ： ％）
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Suitable production sites in the medium and long run
Country
(ASEAN/India)
no. of effective
replies Thailand Malaysia Singapore Indonesia Philippines Vietnam India China
others
(Hong Kong/Taiwan)
Thailand 199 124 0 0 4 1 30 20 16 4
Malaysia 169 28 68 0 2 1 30 10 18 12
Singapore 95 16 5 23 8 0 20 5 14 4
Indonesia 149 21 2 2 53 0 21 18 20 12
Philippines 180 30 3 0 3 54 50 10 19 11
Vietnam 84 9 1 0 0 0 48 9 7 10
India 61 9 0 1 3 0 0 38 6 4
Total（note） 937 237 79 26 73 56 199 110 100 57
Note: Total is the summation of the number of firms that select countries and regions as suitable production sites.
Source: Japan External Trade Organization, Management Conditions of Japanese Firms in the Manufacturing Industries in Asia, March 2006.
Countries and regions selected for suitable production sites Countries where firmsare located
(Unit:number of firms)
 
 
 
 
 
 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Malaysia 364.8 404.8 163.9 288.4 343.2 396.4 435.0 405.0 487.6 552 490
Thailand 589.1 363.2 144.1 218.3 262.2 297.0 409.4 533.2 626.0 703 680
Indonesia 337.4 386.7 58.3 93.8 301.0 299.6 317.8 354.6 483.1 534 320
Philippines 162.1 144.4 80.2 74.4 83.9 76.7 85.6 92.3 88.1 n.a. n.a.
Vietnam 7.9 5.9 9.7 10.5 12.0 19.6 28.9 43.0 40.1 n.a. n.a.
Source:  "Automobile Statistics of Main Countries", "Annual Automobile Statistics of the World"(JAMA),
               "Monthly Automobile Survey of the World (No.237 May 2005), (No.242 October2005)" (FOURIN)
（Unit：thousand）
Table 3. Automobile Sales Figures in Main ASEAN Countries (1996-2004)
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1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Malaysia 390.6 449.8 164.1 302.8 359.2 428.7 456.8 424.1 487.6
Thailand 559.4 360.3 158.1 327.2 411.7 459.4 585.0 742.1 928.1
Indonesia 325.5 389.3 58.1 89.0 292.7 279.2 299.3 322.0 n.a.
Philippines 136.6 111.0 45.0 65.6 70.9 65.2 74.8 84.2 n.a.
Vietnam 6.0 6.3 5.0 6.5 13.4 20.7 26.7 41.1 n.a.
Source: "Automobile Statistics of Main Countries", "Annual Automobile Statistics of the World" (JAMA),
              Thailand Automotive Institute, Malaysia Automotive Association
(Unit: thousand)
Table 4. Automobile Production Figures in Main ASEAN Countries (1996-2004)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Production, Trade and Domestic Sales
Year 2005 (Unit: 1,000)
Country Production Export Import Domestic Sales
Japan 10,800 5,053 268 5,852
China 5,708 195 162 5,762
Korea 3,699 2,586 32 1,142
ASEAN 2,365 531 1,885
　Thailand 1,125 464 703
　Malaysia 563 47 551
　Indonesia 622 10 534
　Philippines 55 10 97
India 1,642 196 n.a. 1,440
Taiwan 446 n.a. n.a. 515
Total 24,660 n.a. n.a. 16,528
Source： FOURIN's Monthly Report on the Global Automotive Industry, April 2006  
26 
 
Table 6. Reasons for Promising Countries and Regions
2006 Survey
　　　         　       ※(number of repliers)
1.China
（362）
2.India
（223）
3. Vietnam
（154）
4. Thailand
（133）
5. USA
（101）
6. Russia
（94）
7. Brazil
（44）
8. Korea
（41）
9. Indonesia
（37）
10. Taiwan
（26）
0 Risk averse to other countries 1.9 10.8 36.4 21.1 1.0 4.3 9.1 2.4 5.4 -
0 Sites to export to Japan 15.2 2.2 11.0 12.8 - 1.1 4.5 - 18.9 3.8
0 Sites to export to the third countries 19.3 9.4 18.2 28.6 1.0 - 11.4 7.3 27.0 7.7
0 Present large size of local markets 24.9 11.7 5.2 24.1 70.3 14.9 15.9 41.5 27.0 50.0
0 Growth potential of local markets 82.3 83.0 46.8 42.1 44.6 93.6 81.8 73.2 59.5 69.2
0 Profitability of local markets 7.2 4.0 3.9 10.5 21.8 8.5 13.6 17.1 13.5 11.5
0 Political and social stability 1.4 5.8 15.6 24.8 37.6 3.2 6.8 7.3 2.7 3.8
1 Developed infrastructure 5.8 1.8 3.9 27.8 42.6 4.3 4.5 17.1 8.1 15.4
2 Developed logistics services 3.0 0.4 1.9 6.8 24.8 - - 9.8 8.1 11.5
2 Preferential tax system 13.5 5.4 16.9 24.1 2.0 4.3 4.5 12.2 - 19.2
2 Stable policies 1.4 1.3 8.4 16.5 5.0 1.1 2.3 4.9 2.7 3.8
3 Excellent human resources 16.6 35.0 35.1 17.3 15.8 5.3 6.8 9.8 8.1 11.5
3 Cheap labor 57.2 44.4 71.4 45.9 2.0 17.0 22.7 7.3 54.1 15.4
4 Cheap parts and materials 23.5 9.0 5.8 9.0 4.0 3.2 6.8 2.4 16.2 11.5
4 Supply sites to assemble companies 27.3 21.1 22.7 36.8 18.8 16.0 18.2 12.2 18.9 15.4
4 Industrial agglomeration 16.6 6.3 4.5 30.1 19.8 2.1 4.5 12.2 10.8 11.5
5 Sites for product development 4.4 2.2 1.3 5.3 12.9 - - 2.4 - -
Source: Outlook for Japanese Foreign Direct Investment , 2006 JBIC (Japan Bank for International Cooperation) Institute, May 2007.
(Unit: %)
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.　Problems in localization of employees, products and technology
Problems in localizing employees
                         　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　                         ※(number of repliers)
China
(462)
Thailand
(265)
Malaysia
(145)
Indonesia
(152)
Vietnam
(93)
India
(77)
Shortage of local managers employable at reasonable wages 50.2 45.3 33.1 48.0 44.1 27.3
Shortage of top managers to promote localization 39.4 37.7 36.6 52.0 39.8 28.6
Difficulty of smooth communication 37.9 27.9 18.6 28.9 32.3 26.0
Prevention of outflow of secret information to other firms(including job hopping) 34.0 18.9 17.2 19.1 16.1 23.4
Difficulty of making the manual of work processes 16.2 14.0 12.4 12.5 19.4 14.3
Construction of staff evaluation system suitable to local employees 16.7 9.8 9.7 12.5 12.9 18.2
Others 3.5 3.8 8.3 3.9 5.4 14.3
No problem 8.0 18.5 21.4 9.9 14.0 14.3
Problems in localizing products
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　                    ※(number of repliers)
China
(400)
Thailand
(218)
Malaysia
(116)
Indonesia
(136)
Vietnam
(78)
India
(61)
Shortage of technology of local firms 55.3 45.0 32.8 51.5 38.5 41.0
Prevention secret information from flowing out other firms (including the outflow of blueprints) 35.0 12.8 12.9 12.5 15.4 18.0
Shortage of competitiveness in costs of Japanese and foreign firms 17.0 12.4 20.7 15.4 17.9 14.8
Shortage of competitiveness in costs with local firms 14.8 15.6 11.2 17.6 16.7 13.1
Lack in local supporting industries 12.3 6.9 11.2 16.9 34.6 24.6
Shortage of technology of Japanese and foreign firms 9.5 9.2 3.4 11.0 12.8 4.9
Others 7.5 6.0 5.2 4.4 3.8 13.1
No problem 14.3 33.0 34.5 20.6 15.4 14.8
Source: 2006 JBIC Institute (the same source as that of Table 7).
(Unit : %)
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Table 8. Evaluation Index of  Investment Environment of ASEAN and India in Comparison with China
Evaluation Items (2006) Thailand Malaysia SingaporeIndonesia Vietnam India
Pre-condition Infrastructure 64.5 67.0 95.6 ▲59.8 ▲74.6 ▲77.5
Tax system 50.4 61.7 97.1 ▲35.2 7.0 ▲13.2
Transparency of laws related to investment 68.9 66.1 92.6 ▲17.2 6.9 22.5
Little risk of volatility of currency exchange rates 13.1 30.2 52.2 ▲68.1 28.1 ▲13.2
Import procedures 42.0 64.2 95.6 ▲14.4 ▲7.0 ▲40.5
Protector of intellectual property rights 34.2 38.5 94.1 ▲12.1 ▲6.9 39.5
Easiness of personnel labor management 52.0 21.2 85.1 ▲4.4 48.3 0.0
Level of research and skilled labor ▲7.4 ▲9.5 75.0 ▲65.6 ▲20.7 33.3
Political and social stability 90.8 84.8 95.7 ▲22.7 73.8 50.0
Communication of capability of employees 34.6 52.7 88.2 ▲7.4 20.3 71.8
Agglomeration Level of development of supporting industries 27.5 ▲6.6 22.1 ▲71.1 ▲85.2 ▲31.6
(Note)　A=(Number of firms who replied “superior”)-(Number of firms who replied “inferior”)
            B=(Number of firms who replied “superior”)+(Number of firms who replied “inferior”)
            Evaluation Index=(A/B)×100
Source： JETRO, Current Management of Japanese Manufacturing Industries in Asia, March 2006.
(Unit: %)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9. Questionnaire Survey on an Application of Flowchart Approach to Industrial Cluster Policy
(May 2007)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 %
1.　Is the size of market of Malyasia large? × × × ○ × × × × × X 10
2.　Can Malaysia be export sites? × ○ × ○ ○ × ○ × ○ X 50
3.  Can foreign auto firms invest in Malaysia under the present regulations? × ○ × ○ × × ○ × × X 30
4.  Can foreign auto firms invest in Malaysia under the shortage of unskilled labor? ○ × ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ X 80
5.　Can Malaysia catch up Thailand in the supporting industry? × ○ × × × × ○ × × ○ 30
6.　Are the controls over foreign capital inflow of suppliers to the national cars deregulated? × ○ × × × × ○ × ○ X 30
Source: Author.  
